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Let’s Talk About Gender: Nonbinary
Title VII Plaintiffs Post-Bostock
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held that Title VII’s
sex-discrimination prohibition applies to discrimination against gay and
transgender employees. This decision, surprising from a conservative Court, has
engendered a huge amount of commentary on both its substantive holding and
its interpretive method. This Note addresses a single question arising from this
discourse: After Bostock, how will courts address allegations of sex
discrimination by plaintiffs whose gender identities exist outside of traditional
sex and gender binaries? As this Note explores, some have argued that Bostock’s
textualist logic precludes sex-discrimination claims by nonbinary plaintiffs.
While such arguments fail to recognize the import of pre-Bostock Title VII
jurisprudence, they are worth engaging. Given the history of narrow judicial
interpretations of Title VII, the conservative leanings of the federal bench, and
the controversial nature of gender-discrimination law, this Note argues that
while Title VII protects employees of all gender identities, amending federal law
to explicitly prohibit gender-identity discrimination remains a policy priority
post-Bostock.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Title VII’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination was
passed nearly sixty years ago, American attitudes towards sex and
gender have changed drastically. The statute’s language has not. Law,
however, changes along with the society it structures. Until June 2020,
it was generally understood that Title VII’s 1 prohibition on
discrimination “because of . . . sex” did not reach discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. It was in this context that
Gerald Bostock, Donald Zarda, and Aimee Stephens were fired by their
employers solely for being gay, in the cases of Mr. Bostock and Mr.
Zarda, and transgender, in the case of Ms. Stephens. 2 If the employers
had sought legal counsel before their decisions, they would likely have
been given the all clear: though plaintiffs and scholars had long argued
that Title VII could be interpreted to prohibit sexual-orientation and
gender-identity discrimination, precedent favored the defendant
employers. Nevertheless, all three employees sued, and all three cases
eventually reached the Supreme Court, consolidated in Bostock v.
Clayton County. 3 To the surprise of many observers, the Court held that
the plain text of Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the
bases of homosexuality and transgender identity. 4
Substantively and symbolically, Bostock is a triumph for
LGBTQIA+ rights: thousands of American workers are legally
protected from discrimination based on a core component of their
identities. But the opinion also does little to clarify the law’s
understandings of “sex” as a statutory term or to assist courts in
understanding sex discrimination claims by plaintiffs whose identities
exist throughout the universe of gender. This Note examines Bostock’s
effect on one subset of plaintiffs: those whose gender identities exist
outside the male/female binary.

1.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
[to discriminate against an employee] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” (emphasis added)).
2.
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
3.
Both Mr. Zarda and Ms. Stephens died before the Supreme Court decided the case. Adam
Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/gay-transgender-workers-supremecourt.html?searchResultPosition=1 (last updated June 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WWV2-4RF5].
Their estates continued to pursue the cases after their deaths. Id.
4.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
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Part I first provides background on the concepts of sex, gender,
and gender identity in the hopes of orienting the reader and
establishing clear usage of these terms. It then provides background on
both Bostock itself and pre-Bostock Title VII discrimination law,
focusing
on
sex-stereotyping
discrimination
and
sex-plus
discrimination. Part II analyzes how the Bostock court relied on binary
conceptions of gender and illustrates, through a hypothetical, how
nonbinary litigants might argue for Title VII protection post-Bostock
and how their opponents might respond. Finally, Part III offers a
legislative solution: even after Bostock, Title VII, along with other
federal antidiscrimination laws, should be amended to explicitly protect
gender identity and sexual orientation in order to provide more stable
protection for people of all genders.
I. SEX, GENDER, AND THE LAW
A. Sex, Gender, and Gender Identity
Vocabulary and attendant understandings of sex and gender are
continuously evolving. The following discussion defines terms for
purposes of this Note, with several important caveats. First, these
terms are neither universal nor comprehensive. They serve as proxies
for complex issues of identity that likely can never be reduced to
absolute definitions. Second, there are as many gender identities as
there are people. 5 A glossary can never fully capture that diversity and
should not pretend to do so. Finally, the definitions that follow are
largely sociological, not legal—as this Note explores, “sex” in Title VII
may signify something different than “sex” in social science and gender
theory contexts. 6
As with many social issues, the prevailing sociocultural
understandings of sex, gender, and gender identity are helpfully framed
by a social media trend. In so-called “gender reveal parties,” expecting
parents dramatically announce their unborn child’s sex (as determined
by an ultrasound or chromosome analysis) with balloons, cake, or
explosives 7 colored pink to signify a female child or blue to signify a

5.
Thanks to Kate Uyeda for this phrasing.
6.
See infra Part II.C.3.
7.
See Gender-Reveal Device Kills Father-to-Be, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56159731 [https://perma.cc/846C-C8HD]; Christina
Morales & Allyson Waller, A Gender-Reveal Celebration Is Blamed for a Wildfire. It Isn’t the First
Time., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/us/gender-reveal-party-wildfire.html
(last updated July 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/X6Y3-RPCB].
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male child. 8 Such rituals implicitly assume both that the unborn child’s
genitalia or chromosomal makeup indicates the child’s gender and that
the child’s gender will fall into either the girl (pink) or the boy (blue)
category. Gender reveal parties thus reflect two key beliefs: that sex is
completely determinative of gender and that sex and gender are
binaries. Both are incorrect.
Sex and gender are distinct concepts. 9 “Sex,” which is typically
assigned at birth, is a physical classification based on a person’s
genitalia and chromosomal makeup. 10 “Gender” refers to complex social
understandings and expectations of how people of a given sex do or
should behave. 11 The term “gender identity” refers to an individual’s
understanding of their own gender and its relationship to social
categories. 12 Gender identity is internally determined, fluid, and may
change over an individual’s lifetime—a child classified male at birth
may grow up to be a man or a different gender; likewise, a child
classified female at birth might later be a woman, a man, both,
or neither. 13
Sex and gender are not equivalent, but also not wholly
independent. The difference between the two is sometimes colorfully
summarized as sex being what is “between [the] legs” while gender is
what is “between [the] ears.” 14 Many theorists consider gender to be
socially constructed and individually performed, attributable more to
social norms than to innate biological characteristics. 15 However,
gender and gender identity are not solely psychological—both are
intimately linked with the physical body. 16 The categorization of sex as
8.
See Rebecca Desfosse, What’s the Deal with Gender Reveal Parties?, FAM. EDUC.,
https://www.familyeducation.com/whats-deal-gender-reveal-parties (last visited Sept. 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/7458-CF75] (pointing out that, since such events in fact announce the child’s
physical categorization, they would more aptly be called “sex-reveal parties”).
9.
Jennifer Tseng, Sex, Gender, and Why the Differences Matter, 10 AMA J. ETHICS: VIRTUAL
MENTOR 427, 427 (2008).
10. Walter Liszewski, J. Klint Peebles, Howa Yeung & Sarah Arron, Persons of Nonbinary
Gender – Awareness, Visibility, and Health Disparities, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2391, 2392 (2018)
(defining sex as the “reproductive phenotype, categorized as male, female, or intersex”).
11. Tseng, supra note 9 (“Gender refers to the continuum of complex psychosocial selfperceptions, attitudes, and expectations people have about members of both sexes.”).
12. Liszewski et al., supra note 10, at 2392.
13. Id.
14. Neela Ghoshal, Transgender, Third Gender, No Gender: Part II, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept.
8, 2020, 8:19 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/08/transgender-third-gender-no-genderpart-ii [https://perma.cc/U32V-BEYE].
15. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 522 (1988) (“Gender is . . . a construction
that regularly conceals its genesis. The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain
discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of its own production.”).
16. See Vernon A. Rosario, The Biology of Gender and the Construction of Sex?, 10 GLQ: J.
LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 280, 283 (2004) (discussing criticisms, particularly by transgender and queer
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physical and gender as social thus risks oversimplification, but it
remains a helpful starting place for understanding the complexities of
gender identity.
The relationship between sex and gender identity takes many
forms at the individual level. Some people’s gender identities align with
social expectations based on their sex, such as a woman who was
assigned female at birth. Such people are described as “cisgender.” 17
Some people, however, have gender identities that do not match social
expectations of their sex assigned at birth; people in this category
frequently identify as transgender. 18 Some trans individuals’ gender
identities are adequately described by the man/woman gender binary—
like a man assigned female at birth or a woman assigned male at
birth. 19 Others—whether or not they identify as trans—have a gender
identity that is not adequately described by either “man” or “woman.” 20
While individuals describe their gender identities in diverse ways, 21
this Note will use the term “nonbinary” as an umbrella term to refer to
gender identities that do not fit neatly in the man/woman binary
framework. 22 Some people with nonbinary gender identities use gender
neutral pronouns like “they” rather than gendered pronouns like “he”

theorists, of feminist theories that discuss gender as completely separate from the physical body);
C. E. Roselli, Neurobiology of Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation, 30 J.
NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY e12562 (2018) (discussing evidence of biological components of sexual and
gender identity).
17. Liszewski et al., supra note 10, at 2392. The Latin prefix “cis” means “on this side of,”
while “trans” means “across.” Avery Dame, Tracing Terminology: Researching Early Uses of
“Cisgender,” PERSPS. ON HIST. (May 22, 2017), https://www.historians.org/publications-anddirectories/perspectives-on-history/may-2017/tracing-terminology-researching-early-uses-ofcisgender [https://perma.cc/45VY-WRQ7]. The term “cisgender” was officially added to the Oxford
English Dictionary in 2015, though it had been in popular usage for many years prior. Id.
18. Liszewski et al., supra note 10, at 2392; PFLAG National Glossary of Terms, PFLAG,
https://pflag.org/glossary (last updated Jan. 2021) [https://pflag.org/glossary]. The term
transgender is often shortened to “trans” and sometimes “trans*,” with the asterisk signifying
inclusion of all gender-nonconforming identities. See Transgender Identity Terms and Labels,
PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/genderPLANNED
identity/transgender/transgender-identity-terms-and-labels (last visited Sept. 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/KT4K-KX6R]. This Note will use transgender and trans interchangeably.
19. See Understanding Non-Binary People: How to Be Respectful and Supportive, NAT’L CTR.
TRANSGENDER
EQUAL.
(Oct.
5,
2018),
FOR
https://transequality.org/issues/resources/understanding-non-binary-people-how-to-be-respectfuland-supportive [https://perma.cc/PN4B-S9F5].
20. Id.
21. Id. (noting that nonbinary is only one way to describe such identities and noting other
terms including genderqueer, agender, and bigender).
22. CHARLIE MCNABB, NONBINARY GENDER IDENTITIES: HISTORY, CULTURE, RESOURCES 19
(2017).

1512

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1507]

or “she.” 23 Others—whether or not they identify as nonbinary—use
more than one type of pronoun. 24
When gender is understood primarily as a social rather than
biological category, its fluidity is unsurprising. Sex, however, also
sometimes resists binary categories. While most bodies are classified
relatively easily as either male or female, a disputed number of people
are born with anatomy that is neither clearly male nor clearly female; 25
such bodies are usually classified as “intersex.” 26 The existence of
intersex individuals undermines prevailing notions of sex as a
male/female binary. Those born without definitively male or female sex
characteristics have historically been subjected to surgery, often while
still infants, to “normalize” their anatomy and define their sex as either
male or female. 27 This practice has recently attracted significant
criticism, particularly from intersex advocates, and parents of intersex
children are increasingly rejecting the practice. 28 Intersexuality, like
gender identity diversity, complicates the binary conceptions that have
historically undergirded both social and legal treatments of sex
and gender.
While social awareness of sex and gender diversity has grown in
recent years, widespread understanding of sex and gender diversity is
still lacking, 29 and news related to gender identity frequently sparks

23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Michelle Kim, Halsey Thanks Fans for Support After Announcing Pronouns Are
“She/They,” THEM. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.them.us/story/halsey-thanks-fans-support-afterannouncing-pronouns-she-they-kehlani [https://perma.cc/ZV4R-6VL4].
25. See How Common Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., https://isna.org/faq/frequency/
(last visited Sept. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VEB3-NHQM] (noting differing opinions about what
types of anatomy variations should be designated as intersex); Melanie Blackless, Anthony
Charuvastra, Amanda Derryck, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Karl Lauzanne & Ellen Lee, How Sexually
Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 159 (2000) (estimating
that 1.7% of people are born intersex); Leonard Sax, How Common Is Intersex? A Response to Anne
Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. SEX RSCH. 174, 177 (2002) (estimating that .018% of people are born
intersex).
26. Liszewski et al., supra note 10, at 2392.
27. Laura Sundin, Note, Imposing Identity: Why States Should Restrict Infant Intersex
Surgery, 73 SMU L. REV. 637, 643–46 (2020).
28. Id.; Julie Compton, ‘You Can’t Undo Surgery’: More Parents of Intersex Babies Are
Rejecting Operations, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2018, 3:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbcout/you-can-t-undo-surgery-more-parents-intersex-babies-are-n923271 [https://perma.cc/JWD5L7U3].
29. Many organizations provide glossaries, FAQ pages, and other educational resources on
gender and gender identity. See, e.g., Sex and Gender Identity, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/gender-identity/sex-gender-identity (last visited Sept.
13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S59H-ZSWK]; Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identityterminology-and-definitions (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A97P-NKFV].
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controversy. 30 The apparently nascent state of social consciousness is
not evidence that diverse gender identities are novel or purely modern
creations—nonbinary gender identities and gender nonconformity have
deep historical roots in many cultures. 31 Still, in the contemporary
United States, discrimination against transgender, nonbinary, and
otherwise gender-diverse people pervades all spheres of life. 32 In recent
months, state legislatures have introduced a slew of anti-trans
legislation targeting access to health care, public accommodations, and
sports participation. 33 Importantly, transgender and nonbinary
individuals report high levels of workplace mistreatment and concern
about workplace discrimination. 34
Despite these barriers, times are changing. Younger generations
report higher levels of awareness and acceptance of nonbinary gender
identities and related issues, with one study finding that nearly a third
of Gen Zers (those born in 1997 or later) know someone who uses gender
neutral pronouns. 35 Millennials (those born between 1981 and 1996)
30. See, e.g., SE Fleenor, If You Don’t Understand Demi Lovato’s Nonbinary Gender Identity,
That’s OK, INDEP. (May 19, 2021, 9:30 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/demi-lovatononbinary-gender-b1850411.html [https://perma.cc/MU3D-FV4G] (discussing a variety of
reactions to the singer’s announcement regarding their nonbinary identity). Conversations around
issues of transgender identity and gender transitions tend to be especially heated. See, e.g., Abby
Gardner, A Complete Breakdown of the J.K. Rowling Transgender-Comments Controversy,
GLAMOUR, https://www.glamour.com/story/a-complete-breakdown-of-the-jk-rowling-transgendercomments-controversy (last updated July 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/56S4-29MA] (discussing the
Harry Potter author’s controversial tweets and subsequent essay, viewed by many as transphobic).
31. See A Map of Gender-Diverse Cultures, PBS: INDEP. LENS (Aug. 11, 2015)
https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-spirits_map-html/
[https://perma.cc/HPK4RP5D] (collecting historical information about cultures across the world that have recognized more
than two genders).
32. S.E. JAMES, J.L. HERMAN, S. RANKIN, M. KEISLING, L. MOTTET & M. ANAFI, THE REPORT
OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 4–5 (2015)
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GG2-RHQA] (summarizing findings of a nationwide survey of transgender
individuals’ life experiences and noting high rates of family violence, mistreatment in schools and
workplaces, and sexual violence). While this survey’s title uses the term transgender, a term which
does not always indicate disruption of the man/woman gender binary, 35% of survey respondents
indicated their gender identity as nonbinary. Id. at 45.
33. Wyatt Ronan, 2021 Officially Becomes Worst Year in Recent History for LGBTQ State
Legislative Attacks as Unprecedented Number of States Enact Record-Shattering Number of AntiLGBTQ Measures into Law, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (May 7, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/pressreleases/2021-officially-becomes-worst-year-in-recent-history-for-lgbtq-state-legislative-attacksas-unprecedented-number-of-states-enact-record-shattering-number-of-anti-lgbtq-measures-intolaw [https://perma.cc/V73L-YMF9]; Legislative Tracker: Anti-Transgender Legislation, FREEDOM
FOR ALL AMS., https://freedomforallamericans.org/legislative-tracker/anti-transgender-legislation/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/YE4N-YACH].
34. JAMES ET AL., supra note 32, at 148 (relaying that 30% of respondents reported workplace
mistreatment within the preceding year and 77% reported taking steps to avoid such
mistreatment).
35. See Kim Parker, Nikki Graf & Ruth Igielnik, Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials
on
Key
Social
and
Political
Issues,
PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan.
17,
2019),
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and Gen Zers are more likely than preceding generations to reject
binary conceptions of gender. 36 As younger generations join the
workforce, these views and identities are ever more likely to appear in
employment discrimination cases. Unfortunately, Title VII
jurisprudence—even after Bostock—is ill-suited to assist courts in
understanding and analyzing cases of discrimination against people
with nonbinary sex and gender identities. 37
B. Bostock: A Brief Summary
Gender equality advocates generally anticipated the Bostock
ruling with trepidation. 38 Bostock was the Supreme Court’s first major
LGBTQIA+ rights case since the retirement of Justice Kennedy, the
author of several landmark gay rights decisions including Obergefell v.
Hodges. 39 The appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh had
recently cemented the Court’s conservative majority. 40 In this context,
the 6–3 ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor came as a surprise.

https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/01/17/generation-z-looks-a-lot-like-millennials-on-keysocial-and-political-issues/ [https://perma.cc/Z364-Z47T] (noting that younger generations are
progressively more likely to know someone who uses gender neutral pronouns and to say that
forms and online profiles should include more than two gender designations); see also Shepherd
Laughlin, Gen Z Goes Beyond Gender Binaries in New Innovation Group Data, WUNDERMAN
THOMPSON (Mar. 11, 2016), https://intelligence.wundermanthompson.com/2016/03/gen-z-goesbeyond-gender-binaries-in-new-innovation-group-data/ [https://perma.cc/XM3F-YBFT] (reporting
that 56% of surveyed Gen Zers know someone who uses gender neutral pronouns); see also Michael
Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-andgeneration-z-begins/ [https://perma.cc/HZU9-LXHJ].
36. Curtis M. Wong, 50 Percent of Millennials Believe Gender Is a Spectrum, Fusion’s Massive
Millennial Poll Finds, HUFFPOST: QUEER VOICES, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fusionmillennial-poll-gender_n_6624200 (last updated Feb. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/R8AU-DLW5]; see
also Parker et al., supra note 35 (finding that six in ten Gen Zers believe forms and official
documents should offer gender options beyond “man” and “woman”).
37. Some courts have begun to recognize the extent to which sex discrimination law fails to
reflect contemporary gender theory. In a post-Bostock sex-plus-age discrimination case, the Tenth
Circuit noted in a footnote that certain evidentiary structures in such cases fail to accommodate
nonbinary gender identities. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1047
n.3 (10th Cir. 2020) (“We acknowledge that this framework requiring a comparison between male
and female employees assumes that sex is binary. This case does not raise, and we do not address,
sex discrimination involving intersex or gender non-binary individuals.”).
38. See Adam Liptak, Can Someone Be Fired for Being Gay? The Supreme Court Will Decide,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/politics/supreme-court-firedgay.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/335B-XELV].
39. 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to
marriage); see also Liptak, supra note 38.
40. See Adam Liptak, As the Supreme Court Gets Back to Work, Five Big Cases to Watch, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/06/us/as-the-supreme-court-gets-back-to-work-five-bigcases-to-watch.html?searchResultPosition=4 (last updated Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TUP244W5].

2021]

LET’S TALK ABOUT GENDER

1515

According to the Court, “few facts are needed to appreciate the
legal question” presented in Bostock. 41 Each of the three plaintiffs
before the Court was fired “allegedly for no other reason than [their]
homosexuality or transgender status.” 42 The plaintiffs were Gerald
Bostock, a gay man fired from his job as a child welfare advocate after
joining a recreational gay softball league; Donald Zarda, a gay man fired
from his job as a skydiving instructor after mentioning his sexual
orientation to his employer; and Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman
who was fired from her job at a funeral home after informing her
employer about her transgender identity and her plans to “live and
work full-time as a woman.” 43
Each plaintiff sued their employer in federal court, with
differing results at the circuit level. In Mr. Bostock’s case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of Mr. Bostock’s case, adhering to circuit precedent holding
that Title VII does not prohibit antigay discrimination. 44 In Mr. Zarda’s
case, the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that
expecting employees to have only opposite-sex attraction is a sex-based
stereotype, which is impermissible under Title VII. 45 Similarly, in Ms.
Stephens’s case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on transgender identity because expecting a
person to conform to the gendered expectations of the sex to which they
were assigned at birth “falls squarely into the ambit of sex-based
discrimination.” 46
In contrast to the circuit courts, the Supreme Court treated
Bostock’s issue as wholly a matter of statutory interpretation, without
the explicit reliance on sex-stereotyping case law that predominated in
the lower courts. 47 While taking a textualist approach, the Court also
declined to resolve the parties’ arguments over the meaning of the
statutory term “sex”: assuming, without deciding, that the term refers
only to the narrowest definition—biological categorization—the Court
held that discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender
identity violates the plain meaning of the statute because “the
41. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1737–38 (quoting Ms. Stephens’s letter to her employer).
44. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 Fed. Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (unpublished).
45. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080,
2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 15, 2015) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228).
46. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560 (6th Cir. 2018).
47. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
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individual employee’s [biological] sex plays an unmistakable” role in
such discrimination. 48 That is, discrimination against homosexual or
transgender individuals is prohibited by Title VII because
homosexuality and transgender identities are defined with reference to
the individual’s biological sex. As such, “it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.” 49
Three Justices dissented from the Court’s holding. Justice Alito’s
dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, criticized the holding as legislation
in disguise, noting that a 2019 House bill that stalled in the Senate
would have amended Title VII to explicitly include sexual orientation
and gender identity. 50 In a now infamous passage, Justice Alito accused
the majority of textual piracy. 51 In his view, the majority’s logic
improperly disregarded the conceptual differences between “sex” on the
one hand and sexual orientation and gender identity on the other. 52
Justice Alito went on to discuss parties’ arguments not addressed by
the majority, including reliance on sex-stereotyping precedent 53 and
analogies to race-discrimination cases. 54 Finally, Justice Alito
examined the dictionary definitions of “sex” in an attempt to rebut the
argument that “sex” in 1964 could have had a broader meaning than
biological binary. 55
Justice Kavanaugh also dissented from the Court’s holding,
primarily criticizing it as judicial overreach. 56 Drawing on the famous
bicycle-in-the-park hypothetical, he criticized the majority for adhering
to the “literal” meaning of the statute rather than its ordinary
meaning. 57 He emphasized interpretation of phrases, as opposed to
words in isolation, arguing that the ordinary meaning of discrimination
“because of sex” cannot encompass gender-identity and sexualorientation discrimination because “few in 1964 (or today) would
describe a firing because of sexual orientation as a firing because of
sex.” 58 He also highlighted federal and state politicians distinguishing
“sex” from “sexual orientation” in past legislation and executive

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1741.
Id.
Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1758–59.
Id. at 1763–64.
Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1765.
Id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1824–25.
Id. at 1828.
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orders. 59 Justice Kavanaugh thus viewed the Court’s opinion as a
“transgression of the Constitution’s separation of powers” even as he
recognized “the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian
Americans” (with no mention of the victory of trans people). 60
C. Title VII Precedents
While the textualist approach taken by the majority was
advanced by litigants, 61 it was not the only way. Two other options
frequently advocated by plaintiffs and scholars, and adopted by lower
courts pre-Bostock, were reliance on the sex-stereotyping line of cases
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 62 and reliance on the sex-plus
discrimination line of cases under Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corporation. 63 While the Court did not explicitly take the paths laid by
these precedents, they are nevertheless important for understanding
the law’s relationship with gender and for elucidating the limits and
opportunities of the law for sex-discrimination plaintiffs of all genders.
1. Sex Stereotyping as Sex Discrimination
Long before Bostock, it was established that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against employees for failure to adhere to sex-based
stereotypes. 64 In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm refused to
elevate a high-performing woman associate to partner status because
firm leadership found her to be too abrasive and insufficiently
feminine. 65 The partners reviewing Ms. Hopkins for potential
partnership criticized her in gendered terms, calling her “macho,”
suggesting that her demeanor was “overcompensat[ion] for being a
woman,” and suggesting that she take “a course at charm school.” 66
While aggressiveness can itself be a nondiscriminatory reason for firing
a worker, 67 the Supreme Court held that these gendered criticisms were

59. Id. at 1829–31.
60. Id. at 1837.
61. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Respondents at 12, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) (No. 17-1623), 2019 WL 4464222.
62. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
63. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
64. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228 (1989).
65. Id. at 233–37 (describing coworkers’ assessments of the plaintiff employee’s manner).
66. Id. at 235.
67. In the United States, most employment in non-unionized workforces is at will, meaning
employers can fire workers for any reason, even an arbitrary or illogical one. At-Will Employment
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Apr.
15,
2008),
–
Overview,
NAT’L
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
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evidence that Hopkins’s sex played a role in the firm’s employment
decision, establishing a Title VII violation. 68 As the Court wrote, “if an
employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued
suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not
her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.” 69
Price Waterhouse is typically summarized as holding that Title
VII prohibits sex discrimination by way of sex stereotyping. Put simply,
an employer cannot require its employees to behave in ways
stereotypically associated with their sex. 70 This rule, however, appears
to recognize that Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to
gender discrimination. “Sex stereotypes” are expectations about how a
given person should behave based on their sex—which is exactly how
“gender” is defined in contemporary discourse. 71 The employer in Price
Waterhouse was less concerned about promoting female accountants as
a general matter than it was about the particular female accountant’s
lack of femininity. 72 Thus, Price Waterhouse’s prohibition on
sex stereotyping seems to, without saying as much, prohibit
gender discrimination. 73
The benefits of this framing of Price Waterhouse were not lost on
plaintiffs and scholars before Bostock. One of the main arguments of the
Bostock plaintiffs and amici was that discrimination against gay and
transgender individuals was impermissible sex stereotyping. 74 Price
Waterhouse formed a basis of this argument for both gay and
transgender plaintiffs. In discriminating against either identity, the
[https://perma.cc/A6SF-PH5R]. Employment discrimination law limits at-will employers’
discretion by making some characteristics off-limits for consideration in employment decisions. Id.
68. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
69. Id. at 256.
70. This straightforward statement of Price Waterhouse’s holding obscures significant
complexities in sex stereotyping doctrine. For a start, this summary ignores the distinction
between ascriptive stereotyping, in which employers “ascribe[ ] actual characteristics to their
employees based on their membership in a protected class,” and prescriptive stereotyping, in which
employers “analyze[ ] an employee’s individual characteristics . . . in reference to an unacceptably
biased norm.” Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 406 (2014).
71. See supra Part I.C.1.
72. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (noting that the firm had considered other women
for partnership in the past and that women’s candidacy had been viewed favorably so long as they
were traditionally feminine).
73. Ann C. McGinley, Nicole Buonocore Porter, Danielle Weatherby, Ryan H. Nelson, Pamela
Wilkins & Catherine Jean Archibald, Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton County, 53
CONN. L.R. ONLINE 1, 13 (2020).
74. Id. at 8–10; Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title
VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561 (2007). But see Naomi Schoenbaum, The New Law of Gender
Nonconformity, 105 MINN. L. REV. 831, 836 (2020) (arguing that casting discrimination against
transgender people as sex stereotyping is harmful, in part because it “reif[ies] transgender persons’
birth-designated sex as their legal sex”).
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employer would rely on sex stereotypes: assuming that a person will be
sexually attracted solely to people of the “opposite” sex is a stereotype
based on that individual’s sex. Similarly, expecting a person assigned
female at birth to be a woman, or a person assigned male to be a man,
is a stereotype based solely upon that person’s sex as assigned at birth.
Thus, discrimination against employees for being gay or transgender
impermissibly punishes them for failure to conform to
sex-based stereotypes. 75
Ms. Stephens, represented by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), relied on this argument, 76 and the
lower courts in her case accepted it as the basis of their holdings. 77 The
EEOC had previously adopted similar logic for protection of sexual
orientation in an agency adjudication, stating that “[d]iscrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is premised on sex-based preferences,
assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms” and thus that sexual
orientation discrimination was impermissible sex stereotyping under
Title VII. 78
Despite the ubiquity of the sex-stereotyping logic in lower court
cases, the Bostock majority opinion did not directly address it. 79 The
Court did reaffirm in Bostock that sex stereotyping—as traditionally
applied to a cis, binary plaintiff—is prohibited under Title VII, stating
that “an employer who fires both [a male employee and a female
employee] for failing to fulfill traditional sex stereotypes doubles rather
75. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Viewed through the
lens of the gender non-conformity line of cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to
conform to the female stereotype . . . she is not heterosexual.”); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883
F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Viewing the relationship between sexual orientation and sex through
the lens of gender stereotyping provides yet another basis for concluding that sexual orientation
discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination. Specifically, this framework demonstrates that
sexual orientation discrimination is almost invariably rooted in stereotypes about men and
women.”).
76. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 4, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 2745392.
77. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560, 577 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Title VII protects transgender persons because of their transgender or
transitioning status, because transgender or transitioning status constitutes an inherently gender
non-conforming trait.”).
78. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15,
2015). Because Congress did not grant the EEOC full authority to promulgate substantive
statutory interpretations with the force of law, courts generally do not give the agency’s
interpretations controlling deference under Chevron, U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Eric Drieband & Blake Pulliam, Deference to EEOC Rulemaking and
Sub-Regulatory Guidance: A Flip of the Coin?, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 93 (2016) (noting various
approaches regarding deference to EEOC interpretations of statutes).
79. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (quoting Price Waterhouse for the
proposition that an employee’s sex is irrelevant to employment decisions but not mentioning sex
stereotyping); see McGinley et al., supra note 73, at 8–10.
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than eliminates Title VII liability.” 80 Justice Alito’s dissent paid more
attention to the plaintiffs’ sex-stereotyping arguments, rejecting them
because, in his view, expectations of heterosexuality are not sex
stereotypes, as heterosexuality is a trait expected equally of men and
women. 81 The Court’s choice not to address the Price Waterhouse
argument as a basis of the main holding has been criticized as “jarring”
because of the argument’s prevalence in lower court cases. 82
2. Sex-Plus Discrimination
Another line of Title VII cases provides a different route to the
Bostock result: sex-plus discrimination, a subset of sex-discrimination
claims in which plaintiffs claim they were mistreated based on their sex
in combination with another feature. In such cases, an employee
typically alleges that the employer treated a certain characteristic, like
parenthood or marital status, differently in employees of different
sexes. 83 Courts have generally limited the “plus” characteristic to either
an immutable characteristic, such as race, or to the exercise of a
fundamental right, such as child rearing. 84
Though the term might imply otherwise, sex-plus discrimination
is not discrimination on “more” than sex—instead, it is a judicial
“heuristic” 85 used to recognize sex discrimination that applies only to
certain members of the disfavored class (those with the given
characteristic). 86 In such cases:
[W]hen one proceeds to cancel out the common characteristics of the two classes being
compared (e.g., married men and married women), as one would do in solving an algebraic
equation, the cancelled-out element proves to be that of married status, and sex remains

80. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742–43.
81. See id. at 1763–64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind.,
853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting)).
82. McGinley et al., supra note 73, at 9:
It is the argument’s ubiquity and persuasiveness that renders its absence in the
majority’s opinion in Bostock jarring. To be clear, the majority reaffirms the sex
stereotyping doctrine in dicta, and Justice Alito’s dissent discusses and rebukes the
argument in earnest, but neither the six-justice majority nor Justice Kavanaugh’s
dissent analyzes whether sexual orientation discrimination reflects sex stereotypes.
For an argument that not relying heavily on the sex-stereotyping argument was a positive
development in that the court thereby avoided classifying transgender people as “gender
nonconformers,” which would imply that a trans woman, for example, was not really a woman, see
Schoenbaum, supra note 74.
83. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
84. See Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980); see
also Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age
Discrimination Claims Involving Multiple Discriminatory Motives, 60 B.C. L. REV. 469, 477 (2019).
85. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
86. Id.; Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).
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the only operative factor in the equation. Thus, although the protected class need not
include all women, the plaintiff must still prove that the subclass of women was
unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of men. 87

In this example, the employer discriminates not against women
generally (which would be a plain violation of Title VII), nor against
married people generally (which would not), but against married
women specifically. 88 Thus, sex-plus claims target not animus against
an entire protected class, but more specific biases against certain
members of a protected class who also have another characteristic. 89
The employer’s targeted discrimination—against a specific trait within
a protected class—violates Title VII because the employee’s sex is the
“operative factor” in the discrimination. 90
The Supreme Court first approved a sex-plus theory, though not
by that name, in the 1971 case Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corporation. 91 In Phillips, the Court confronted an employer’s policy of
hiring men, but not women, who were parents of young children. 92 The
appellate court had held that the policy did not violate Title VII because
while the employer clearly treated parenthood differently in men than
in women, it also had a general preference for hiring women—so long
as they were childless. 93 The employer thus had no general bias against
women but treated a characteristic—parenthood—differently in men
than it did in women. 94 In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court established that treating a subset of women differently than a
similarly situated subset of men violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination, regardless of the employer’s treatment of women as a
whole. 95
Over time, the sex-plus doctrine came to include other types of
“plus” characteristics. These are typically characteristics protected by

87. Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit
has since ruled that a sex-plus plaintiff is not required to show that the employer mistreated an
entire subclass, but only that the employer mistreated the individual plaintiff based on their sex.
See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1047 (10th Cir. 2020).
88. Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203.
89. Marc Chase McAllister, Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Form of Sex-Plus
Discrimination, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1007, 1010–11 (2019).
90. Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203.
91. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 544.
93. Id. at 543.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 543–44 (“[Title VII] requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section
as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men—each having pre-school-age
children.”).
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Title VII itself, like race, 96 or unprotected by any antidiscrimination
statute, like parenthood 97 or marital status. 98 Prior to Bostock, some
commentators had suggested that sexual-orientation discrimination
could be recognized as a form of sex-plus discrimination. 99 A sex-plus
framing of a sexual-orientation discrimination claim would entail
arguing that the employer treated attraction to a given gender
differently based on the employee’s sex—that is, the employer tolerated
attraction to men in female employees but not in male employees. 100 In
2018, the First Circuit held that a plaintiff could pursue a sexualorientation discrimination claim under a sex-plus theory as long as that
plaintiff “demonstrates that he or she was discriminated at least in part
because of his or her gender.” 101 Other circuit-level cases, including
those that eventually made their way to the Supreme Court with
Bostock, did not explicitly adopt the sex-plus framework in holding Title
VII protected sexual orientation. 102 Case law and scholarship regarding
the application of a sex-plus theory to antitrans discrimination is less
common, but the logic is much the same: if the employer tolerates a
feminine-coded gender presentation in employees assigned female at
birth, it cannot treat that same presentation differently in an employee
solely because the employee was assigned male at birth.
As with the sex-stereotyping argument, the Bostock opinion did
not directly address a sex-plus basis for its holding. 103 Some of Bostock’s
reasoning, however, implicitly recognizes a sex-plus component of the
discriminatory treatment at issue. According to the Court, an employer
that, for example, discriminates against a gay man but not against a
straight woman impermissibly treats the characteristic of sexual
attraction towards men differently based on the employee’s sex:
Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to
men. The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects,
except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee
for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates
against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague. 104

96. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty.
Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
97. See, e.g., Phillips, 400 U.S. 542.
98. See, e.g., Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997).
99. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 84.
100. Id. at 1011–13.
101. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018).
102. See McAllister, supra note 84, at 1036–56 (discussing cases in the Seventh and Second
Circuits).
103. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
104. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020).
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Similarly, an employer that discriminates against a person
assigned male at birth who identifies and presents as a woman but
tolerates similar feminine-coded presentation in employees assigned
female at birth impermissibly differentiates its employees based on sex:
Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth
but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical
employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a
person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee
identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable
and impermissible role in the discharge decision. 105

Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s treatment
of the case thus amounted to a sex-plus analysis, with the employees’
sexual attraction or gender presentation serving as the “plus”
characteristic that the employers impermissibly treated differently
based on the employee’s sex. 106 The Court’s opinion did not frame the
issue as a sex-plus case, though it did rely in some parts on Phillips 107
for the proposition that the employer’s description of its discriminatory
policy was irrelevant to Title VII liability. 108 The sex-plus line of cases
was thus used to reject the employers’ contention that their intent to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
shielded them from liability for sex discrimination, but it was not
employed as a main vehicle for reaching the result of the case. 109
*

*

*

Scholars and pundits have proposed a host of theories on why
the Bostock decision came out the way it did, both in substance and in
which Justices joined the majority. 110 Whatever the Court’s reasons for
105. Id. at 1741–42.
106. Shirley Lin, SCOTUS’ Landmark Reading of Title VII “Sex” as Encompassing Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: HUM. RTS. HOME BLOG (June
15, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2020/06/scotus-landmark-reading-oftitle-vii-sex-as-encompassing-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity.html
[https://perma.cc/QL55-FBJV] (“[I]mplicitly, the Court for now viewed both [sexual orientation and
transgender] statuses as a ‘plus’ in the vein of its sex-plus precedent, rather than as subsets of
‘sex.’ ”).
107. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
108. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1744.
109. See id. at 1743–44.
110. See, e.g., Charlton C. Copeland, Another Explanation of Justice Gorsuch’s Bostock Vote,
REGUL. REV. (July 22, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/22/copeland-anotherexplanation-gorsuch-bostock-vote/ [https://perma.cc/P2DJ-DZ4N] (suggesting the Bostock decision
furthers Justice Gorsuch’s “battle against the Chevron doctrine” by bolstering the Court’s
credibility among liberals); Ed Whelan, Did the Chief Assign Bostock to Gorsuch? Probably Not,
NAT’L REV. (July 13, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/did-thechief-assign-bostock-to-gorsuch-probably-not/ [https://perma.cc/73TA-SUC6] (suggesting Chief
Justice Roberts joined the opinion “to avoid a 5-4 ruling on a highly controversial issue,” or “in
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its approach, however, the Bostock opinion leaves many questions
unanswered. 111 This Note focuses on just one of these: how Title VII will
apply to plaintiffs who are discriminated against because of their
nonbinary gender identities. The Bostock majority’s repeated use of the
phrase “homosexual or transgender” has raised questions about the
holding’s applicability to bisexual individuals and has led to criticism
over the opinion’s “bisexual erasure.” 112 In a similar vein, the Court’s
narrowly framed textualist approach—hinging entirely on the statutory
term “sex” without defining it—raises questions about how nonbinary
Title VII plaintiffs will be viewed by courts post-Bostock. 113
II. NONBINARY PLAINTIFFS POST-BOSTOCK
The debate over Title VII’s coverage of nonbinary gender
identity persists post-Bostock in part because of the majority’s
nonengagement with contemporary gender theory. While the Court’s
approach arguably does a disservice to nonbinary Americans by inviting
continued debate over their antidiscrimination protections, Bostock is

exchange for votes from liberal justices”); Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Handed Down a
Historic Victory for LGBTQ Rights, SLATE (June 15, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/06/supreme-court-lgbtq-discrimination-employment.html
[https://perma.cc/T2ZAW9N5] (attributing Justice Gorsuch’s position to “genuine integrity” and commitment to textualist
principles).
111. Lower courts have grappled with the opinion’s diverse implications, many of which are
not relevant to this Note. These include the opinion’s discussion of but-for causation, Black v.
Grant Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist., 820 Fed. App’x 547, 551–52 (9th Cir. 2020); emphasis on individual
rather than collective analysis regarding discrimination, Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk,
LLC, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2020); the viability of sex-plus-age claims, id.; and implications for
other federal antidiscrimination statutes, Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s Cnty., 968
F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2020) (relying on Bostock in holding that disallowing a transgender student
from using the bathroom aligned with his gender identity constituted sex discrimination under
Title IX), vacated sub nom Adams v. Sch. Bd, 3 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming the judgment
against the school board on Fourteenth Amendment grounds but not reaching the Title IX
question).
112. See, e.g., Heron Greenesmith, Supreme Court LGBTQ Protections Cover Bisexual and
Pansexual Workers, Too, TEEN VOGUE (June 18, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/supremecourt-lgbtq-protections-bisexual-pansexual-workers
[https://perma.cc/4WEB-A44J];
Nancy
BLADE
(June
25,
2020),
Marcus,
Bostock’s
Bisexual
Erasure,
L.A.
https://www.losangelesblade.com/2020/06/25/bostocks-bisexual-erasure/ [https://perma.cc/RW3ZT9XJ].
113. See Vin Gurrieri, Questions About ‘Nonbinary’ Bias Linger After LGBT Ruling, LAW360
(June 19, 2020, 9:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1284955/questions-about-nonbinarybias-linger-after-lgbt-ruling [https://perma.cc/E8R8-A2F5] (collecting practitioners’ views on the
issue); Ryan Anderson, Symposium: The Simplistic Logic of Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Account of Sex
(June
16,
2020,
1:28
PM),
Discrimination,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-the-simplistic-logic-of-justice-neil-gorsuchsaccount-of-sex-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/M8MC-P7BT] (arguing that nonbinary plaintiffs
are excluded under Bostock’s logic).
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only the latest—not the only—high-profile Title VII case relevant to the
argument.
This Part first turns to the opinion itself and examines how it
reinforced binary conceptions of gender. It then details the ongoing
debate over how Title VII applies to nonbinary individuals. Finally, it
explores possible paths forward for nonbinary Title VII plaintiffs and
the arguments likely to be raised against them.
A. Bostock and the Binary
Though all three plaintiffs before the Court in Bostock subverted
heterosexual and cisgender norms, all three also had binary gender
identities. Gerald Bostock and Donald Zarda were men attracted to
men, and Aimee Stephens was a trans woman assigned male at birth. 114
These identities challenge hetero- and cis-normative beliefs but do not
necessarily undermine binary views of sex and gender. The particular
identities of the plaintiffs before the Court perhaps account for the
opinion’s repeated use of the phrase “homosexual or transgender,” 115
but the usage of the phrase raised questions about whether the case’s
holding applied to other sexual and gender identities. 116 Nonbinary
gender identities are just one such identity. This Part explores how the
Bostock opinions engaged—or failed to engage—with gender diversity
beyond the binary.
The Court appears to have taken great care in its usage of the
terms “sex” and “gender,” with the majority using the latter only five
times. 117 This may reflect an effort toward linguistic precision in
response to long-standing criticism of courts’ inexact uses of gender
terminology. 118 In contrast, the opinions reveal less sensitivity to
contemporary criticisms of binary conceptions of gender. The majority
opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent repeatedly used language like “the
other sex” and “opposite sex,” revealing a conception of two discrete and
opposing sex categories. 119 The majority’s hypotheticals presupposed a
114. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
115. Id. at 1737, 1741, 1742–46, 1753.
116. See McGinley et al., supra note 73, at 14–15; Greenesmith supra note 112; Marcus supra
note 112.
117. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738, 1739, 1748–49.
118. See Meredith Gould, Sex, Gender, and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case for
Transsexualism, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (1979); Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity,
Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What is the “Plain Meaning” of “Sex” in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 573 (2009).
119. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740 (discussing comparison of “one sex as a whole versus the other
as a whole” (emphasis added)); id. at 1748 (“How could sex be necessary to the result if a member
of the opposite sex might face the same outcome from the same policy?” (emphasis added)); id. at
1758 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Both men and women may be attracted to members of the opposite
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gender binary: the hypothetical employees, “Hannah” (a woman) and
“Bob” (a man), appear to fall neatly into the categories of man and
woman. 120 On the other hand, the majority sometimes referred to
employees “of a different sex,” rather than of the “opposite sex,”
suggesting room for more than two binary options. 121 Thus, while the
Bostock holding has clear, groundbreaking legal results for gay and
transgender victims of employment discrimination, it at the same time
left the law on uncertain footing with regard to binary conceptions of
gender and sexuality.
Of all the opinions, Justice Alito’s dissent displayed the most
awareness of gender diversity. Though he ignored distinctions between
sex and gender by linking the physical condition of pregnancy
exclusively to women, 122 he also paid more attention to gender diversity
than did the majority opinion. At one point, his dissent references “a
different gender,” hinting at a possibility of more than two binary
genders. 123 In Justice Alito’s framing, however, gender diversity is a
hazard. He went on to write that, under Bostock, a “gender
fluid . . . person
who
has
not
undertaken
any
physical
transitioning . . . [can] claim the right to use the bathroom or locker
room assigned to the sex with which the individual identifies at that
particular time.” 124 In drawing on the “bathroom predator” myth, 125
sex, members of the same sex, or members of both sexes.” (emphases added)); id. at 1748 (“[T]he
employers’ policies in the cases before us have the same adverse consequences for men and
women.”).
120. Id. at 1741 (majority opinion):
Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to
men. The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind, materially identical in all
respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male
employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer
discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague.
121. Id. at 1737 (“An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender
fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”
(emphasis added)); id. at 1740 (“[A]n employer who intentionally treats a person worse because of
sex—such as by firing the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of
another sex—discriminates against that person in violation of Title VII.” (emphasis added)).
122. Id. at 1775 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[M]otherhood, by definition, is a condition that can be
experienced only by women . . . .”). Some people who are not women have wombs and are capable
of bearing children. See Samantha Schmidt, A Mother, But Not A Woman, WASH. POST (Aug. 16,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2019/08/16/non-binary-pregnant-navigatingmost-gendered-role-all-motherhood/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/A45Q-5WBS].
123. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J. dissenting) (“[I]ndividuals who are born with the
genes and organs of either biological sex may identify with a different gender.”).
124. Id. at 1779 (Alito, J., dissenting).
125. Debates over trans equality have been peppered with unsupported assertions that
allowing people to use facilities aligned with their gender identity will threaten the safety of others,
particularly cis women. See German Lopez, Anti-Transgender Bathroom Hysteria, Explained,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/2016/5/5/11592908/transgender-bathroom-laws-rights (last updated
Feb. 22, 2017, 7:27 PM) [https://perma.cc/A756-6DZB]. There is no evidence to support these
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Justice Alito signaled awareness of contemporary gender theory but
also disapproval of it. As he wrote, an argument can be made that
“neither ‘sexual orientation’ nor ‘gender identity’ is tied to either of the
two biological sexes.” 126 As discussed in the next Part, some
commentators have taken Justice Alito’s invitation, attempting to limit
Bostock—and Title VII’s protection—to plaintiffs whose sexual and
gender identities leave binaries undisturbed. 127
B. The Nonbinary Debate
After Bostock, it is clear that Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality and binary transgender
identity. But commentators still debate whether Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of nonbinary gender identity. 128 To make
direct use of the Bostock opinion’s textualist logic, plaintiffs will have to
find ways to link their discriminated-against trait to the narrowest
definition of “sex,” which the Bostock Court understood as a purely
physical categorization. 129 This logic presents challenges to arguments
in favor of Title VII protection for certain sexualities and gender
identities not represented in the Bostock cases. For example, it is
unclear whether discrimination against a bisexual employee
constitutes sex discrimination, because bisexuality can be defined
without reference to the sex of the employee—and an employer that
discriminates against an employee for attraction to both males and
females would presumably not tolerate that attraction in an employee
of any sex. 130 Whether other sexual orientations not defined in reference
concerns. Amira Hasenbush, Andrew R. Flores & Jody L. Herman, Gender Identity
Nondiscrimination Laws in Public Accommodations: A Review of Evidence Regarding Safety and
Privacy in Public Restrooms, Locker Rooms, and Changing Rooms, 16 SEXUALITY RSCH. & SOC.
POL’Y 70 (2019).
126. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting).
127. Anderson, supra note 113 (“This understanding of gender identity is utterly detached
from sex, not inextricably connected to it. How will Gorsuch handle a plaintiff like this? . . . The
logic of Gorsuch’s opinion, such as it is, makes no sense once you get beyond “trans” gender and
consider contemporary gender theory.”).
128. See, e.g., MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 27.13 (2020) (arguing Bostock clearly applies to nonbinary individuals); Anderson, supra note
113 (arguing it clearly does not); McGinley et al., supra note 73 (arguing that Bostock leaves a gap
to be filled by future cases).
129. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“[W]e proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ signified what
the employers suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between male and female.”).
130. See, e.g., Greenesmith, supra note 112 (“For non-legal readers, Gorsuch’s ‘gay or
transgender’ language might sound as if it deliberately excludes bisexual and pansexual people
(who can be transgender, cisgender, or nonbinary) from protection.”); Marcus, supra note 112
(noting that if a bisexual woman dates a man she may be less likely to face workplace
discrimination than when she dates a woman and that “[t]he only thing that has changed in the
two scenarios is the sex of the person [she is] dating, not [her] sexual orientation”).
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to a person’s sex (like pansexuality or asexuality) are protected is even
murkier. 131
In this vein, some have suggested that Bostock’s logic cannot
extend to nonbinary plaintiffs because nonbinary gender identity,
unlike binary transgender identity or homosexuality, “is utterly
detached from sex, not inextricably connected to it.” 132 In this
understanding, because nonbinary gender identity does not define itself
with reference to a biological sex, the Bostock opinion’s logic cannot
accommodate it: a nonbinary plaintiff cannot link their discriminatedagainst trait to the narrowest definition of the statutory term “sex,” and
thus sex cannot have been a but-for cause in the action taken against
them. 133
Other commentators have argued that Bostock’s logic clearly
extends to nonbinary gender identities, because nonbinary identities
are understood against the backdrop of an individual person’s biological
sex:
Bostock . . . applies with equal force to non-binary people as it does to transgender men
and women. . . . A person is understood as non-binary by virtue of sex-based
characteristics. Thus, an employer who fires an employee for being non-binary penalizes
the non-binary person for “traits or actions” tolerated in binary male or female colleagues,
and inevitably sex is a but-for cause. 134

In this view, discrimination against nonbinary people is clearly sex
discrimination because an employer that discriminates against a
nonbinary person almost certainly objects to sex-associated
characteristics or gender presentations in the nonbinary employee that
131. Nancy C. Marcus, Bostock v. Clayton County and the Problem of Bisexual Erasure, 115
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 223, 230 (2020); see also McGinley et al., supra note 73, at 10:
[I]t is possible that Bostock bans discrimination based on bisexuality because
bisexuality can be defined by the employee’s sex (i.e., firing a male employee because
he is attracted to, inter alia, men, a trait or action the employer tolerates in his female
colleagues). However, it is also possible that Bostock does not prohibit discrimination
based on bisexuality because bisexuality can just as easily be defined without regard to
the employee’s sex (i.e., firing an employee for being attracted to individuals of either
binary sex). Even less clear is whether Bostock bans discrimination based on
pansexuality (i.e., attraction to individuals regardless of sex), asexuality (i.e., no sexual
attraction), or demisexuality or graysexuality (i.e., limited sexual attraction), all of
which manifest the sex-based stereotype of heterosexism but none of which
definitionally rely on the sex of the employee.
132. Anderson, supra note 113; see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[N]either ‘sexual orientation’ nor ‘gender identity’ is tied to either of the two biological sexes.”).
133. Cf. Daniel Hemel, The Problem with That Big Gay Rights Decision? It’s Not Really About
POST
(June
17,
2020.),
Gay
Rights,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/17/problem-with-that-big-gay-rights-decisionits-not-really-about-gay-rights/ [https://perma.cc/V92L-DE5Y] (noting that if an employer
discriminates against all bisexual employees regardless of gender, “[t]he same trait—being
attracted to both men and women—is treated the same for both men and women”).
134. ROSSEIN, supra note 128, § 27.13.
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it tolerates in binary male or female employees. This interpretation is
attractive in both its simplicity and its result but may risk
oversimplifying Bostock’s reasoning and leaving nonbinary plaintiffs
vulnerable to arguments against Title VII protection.
Neither of these positions—that Bostock clearly excludes or
clearly includes nonbinary gender identity—is eminently apparent. On
the one hand, as discussed above, the Justices showed little interest in
disrupting binary conceptions of gender. This fact may well have
consequences for future plaintiffs, since parties and courts will be able
to point to nonbinary gender identity as a distinguishing fact in future
cases, with little guidance on how to approach such a plaintiff. 135 On the
other hand, it seems almost certain that an employer who discriminates
against a nonbinary employee will consider sex- and gender-related
characteristics in taking adverse employment actions, and plaintiffs
will be able to point to impermissible distinctions made by the employer
between the nonbinary individual and the binary individuals who were
not discriminated against. If the plaintiff can point out where sex
played a role in the employer’s decision, Bostock, with its strong
statement against the consideration of sex in employment decisions,
may be a helpful precedent. 136 Pre-Bostock jurisprudence, however, may
be even more important.
C. Nonbinary Title VII Plaintiffs: Bostock and Beyond
Constructing a hypothetical claim by a nonbinary plaintiff
elucidates routes toward a more inclusive Title VII jurisprudence.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that, as discussed above,
gender identities and presentations are highly variable and deeply
personal. While a plaintiff whose presentation directly challenges
binary assumptions by combining traditionally masculine and feminine
traits is beneficial for hypothetical purposes, it should not be assumed
that all nonbinary individuals look like the plaintiff imagined below.
Nonbinary people are not necessarily androgynous and do not
necessarily use gender neutral pronouns. Conversely, a person who
combines masculine and feminine traits or dress and uses genderneutral pronouns is not necessarily nonbinary. The following is meant
only to reveal gaps and opportunities in Title VII jurisprudence in
response to ongoing debates about Bostock’s implications for genderdiverse plaintiffs in antidiscrimination law.
135. Cf. Hemel, supra note 133 (“Worryingly, Gorsuch’s opinion avoids using the word
‘bisexual’ or any acronym that contains it, suggesting that this group still may lack robust
protection.”).
136. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (majority opinion).
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For this discussion, assume the following: Robin identifies as
nonbinary, uses they/them pronouns, and wears clothing without
regard to gender categories—Robin sometimes wears skirts, sometimes
wears ties, sometimes wears makeup, and sometimes has untrimmed
facial hair. Robin sometimes wears feminine-coded apparel or makeup
while simultaneously wearing masculine-coded apparel or a beard.
Robin is the only nonbinary employee at the Employer. Other
employees wear beards, makeup, and clothing in ways that align with
binary expectations of gender—men wear beards and ties, and women
wear skirts and makeup. The Employer is uncomfortable with Robin’s
appearance and fires them for no reason other than their nonbinary
gender presentation. Robin decides to sue the Employer under federal
law.
1. Post-Bostock, Title VII Prohibits Gender- Identity
Discrimination
The simplest argument in Robin’s favor, and the one generally
endorsed by the political left, is that Bostock itself establishes that Title
VII prohibits gender-identity discrimination, including against those
with nonbinary gender identities. The Employer will no doubt contest
this interpretation, arguing that nonbinary gender identity, unlike
binary transgender identity or homosexuality, cannot be linked to the
statutory term “sex.” The Employer will argue that it fired Robin not
for failure to conform to their sex assigned at birth, but for their failure
to present as one binary gender or the other. It is not Robin’s sex that
is causing the Employer’s discomfort, but their combination of gendered
traits. That is, the Employer does not care what Robin’s gender is—so
long as it is clearly defined as either man or woman. Some courts may
be willing to accept this reasoning: unlike the Bostock employers, the
Employer here is not requiring that Robin adhere to a gender
presentation aligned with their sex as assigned at birth. Rather, the
Employer is requiring that Robin present as either a man or a woman,
regardless of their sex as assigned at birth. If we assume, as the
Bostock Court did, that “sex” in Title VII refers only to a physical
categorization, the Employer’s action is arguably outside the statute’s
prohibition because Robin’s medically assigned sex is irrelevant to the
employer’s decision.
Bostock alone provides little help in rebutting this argument. As
explored above, the Bostock decision hinged on the still-undefined term
“sex.” 137 In holding that discrimination against homosexual and
137. See supra Part I.B (noting that Bostock defers the definitional question of “sex”).
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transgender employees constitutes sex discrimination, the Court
reasoned that because “homosexuality and transgender status are
inextricably bound up with sex . . . to discriminate on these grounds
requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees
differently because of their sex.” 138 Assuming that the narrowest
definition of sex applies, this logic extends imperfectly to nonbinary
plaintiffs, because, unlike a transgender person whose gender identity
is “opposite” their sex assigned at birth, a man who is sexually attracted
exclusively to men, or a woman who is sexually attracted exclusively to
women, nonbinary identity does not align or oppose itself with one
biological sex or another. Thus, discrimination against people with
nonbinary gender identities is less clearly linked to the narrowest
definition of “sex,” and given the textualist basis of the Bostock opinion,
this raises potential problems for nonbinary plaintiffs seeking
protection under Title VII.
2. Sex-Stereotyping and Sex-Plus Precedents Establish Title VII
Protection
If direct reliance on Bostock fails, Robin could draw on preBostock Title VII precedents to argue in favor of protection of nonbinary
gender identity.
The Price Waterhouse line of sex-stereotyping cases provides a
promising path forward, though by no means a sure one. 139 In that case,
the accounting firm’s objection to Ms. Hopkins was that she failed to
adhere to gendered expectations of how a person of her sex should walk,
dress, and speak. 140 In this hypothetical, the Employer’s objection to
Robin is similar—by not identifying or presenting as one of the binary
genders, Robin is disrupting gendered stereotypes, regardless of what
sex they were assigned at birth. Requiring Robin to present as either a
man or a woman is to require them to conform to sex stereotypes: ideas
linking ties and facial hair to masculinity and skirts and makeup to
femininity are themselves sex stereotypes, as is the idea that a person
can or should be exclusively masculine or feminine. Under Price
Waterhouse, the Employer’s insistence that Robin conform to such
gendered expectations is thus impermissible sex stereotyping. 141
138. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742.
139. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (gender stereotyping is sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII); see supra Section I.C.1 (discussing the Price Waterhouse
line of sex-stereotyping cases).
140. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
141. See id. at 258 (holding that when an employer discriminates against an employee based
on gendered expectations, the employer has violated Title VII).
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Sex-plus discrimination precedents may also provide a basis for
Robin’s argument. Robin engages in a variety of behaviors that the
Employer tolerates in other employees: Robin’s coworkers wear skirts,
ties, makeup, and beards, just as Robin does. Thus, regardless of
Robin’s sex as assigned at birth, the Employer objects to characteristics
in Robin that it allows in employees of another sex. It allows skirts and
makeup for women and ties and beards for men; Robin wears all these
things. The Employer thus treats the same characteristics differently
in employees of different sexes—impermissible under sex-plus
discrimination precedent. 142
In response to these arguments, the Employer is again likely to
defend its actions by hewing closely to the narrowest definition of “sex.”
The Employer will attempt to distinguish its action from those in sexstereotyping and sex-plus cases by arguing that what is at issue here is
not sex at all—it is gender. That is, it is unimportant to the Employer
whether Robin was assigned male, female, intersex, or anything else at
birth. The Employer does not care whether Robin presents as a woman
or a man or whether that presentation aligns with what may have been
assumed about Robin at their birth. Instead, the Employer wants Robin
to pick one binary gender presentation and stick to it. If the Employer
ultimately does not care whether Robin presents as a man or a woman,
its action is arguably distinguishable from that in Price Waterhouse,
where the employer wished for Ms. Hopkins to adhere to the stereotypes
associated with her sex as assigned at birth. As to sex-plus logic, though
the Employer objects to characteristics in Robin that it tolerates in its
binary employees, its bias does not clearly attach to a particular sex.
Rather, the bias is directed at people—of any assigned sex—that exist
somewhere outside the gender binary. Here again, the Bostock opinion’s
textualist logic poses a potential barrier to a nonbinary plaintiff’s Title
VII claim.
3. Despite Bostock, “Sex” Includes Gender
Even if reliance on pre-Bostock Title VII precedents fails,
Bostock left open a crucial question that may provide another
opportunity: the definition of the statutory term “sex.” Though the
Court studiously avoided defining the term, it did not foreclose future
arguments for an expansive understanding of “sex” in Title VII. 143 Thus,
nonbinary plaintiffs still could prevail on Title VII claims on the theory
142. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (sexplus discrimination); see supra Section I.C.2 (explaining the concept of sex-plus discrimination and
the precedents behind sex-plus discrimination).
143. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
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that the term encompasses gender identity—even if that gender
identity is not associated with a biological sex.
Reading Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition to include
gender identity makes sense. At the time of the bill’s passage, “sex”
referred to a host of social markers that contemporary gender theory
would refer to as gender. 144 In the 1960s, “gender” and “sexual
orientation” had not yet entered the common lexicon, 145 and the term
“sex” was used to denote concepts that today would likely be described
as “gender.” 146 To hold, therefore, that “sex” in Title VII includes gender
is likely in line with the drafters’ intent. 147
Further, Title VII precedents support a reading of “sex” as
broader than mere biological categorization. As we have seen, gender
discrimination is implicated in the sex-stereotyping line of cases. 148
Indeed, the Bostock majority itself relied on understandings of “sex” as
“gender” in its discussion of Title VII precedents, though without
explicit acknowledgement. 149 “Sex” in Title VII has thus been operating
as “gender” since at least Price Waterhouse, and likely since enactment,
at least with regard to people with cis, binary gender identities.
Applying that logic to nonbinary plaintiffs would be in accord not only
with social progress but also with precedent.
Bostock’s deferral of the definitional question of “sex” provides
opportunities for future nonbinary sex discrimination plaintiffs, but
also provides fuel for their opponents. The Supreme Court’s decision not
to read the term broadly when given a high-profile chance to do so might
signal to lower courts that the term is to be construed narrowly. Courts’
historical predilections for “cramped” readings of Title VII also may
present a challenge. 150 Conceptions of the provision’s history may also
144. Weiss, supra note 118, at 618 (“[W]hen the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, sex had
a meaning functionally different from its meaning today. It was generally accepted that, as Freud
had explained, ‘anatomy is destiny.’ Sex referred to a whole constellation of biological
characteristics inextricably intertwined with correlative social, behavioral, and psychological
conventions.”).
145. William N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, The Meaning of Sex:
Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1551–
54 (2021).
146. Id. at 1555.
147. Weiss, supra note 118, at 618.
148. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing how sex-stereotyping case law seems to implicitly
address gender discrimination).
149. Eskridge et al., supra note 145, at 1559.
150. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“This is not the first time the Court has ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII,
incompatible with the statute’s broad remedial purpose.”); Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting
Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
55, 63–67 (2016) (discussing how the scope of antidiscrimination law has shrunk because Title VII
jurisprudence lacks a “compelling theory of antidiscrimination”); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex

1534

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1507]

play a role: Title VII’s sex-discrimination provision is popularly
understood as an amendment introduced with the purpose of scuttling
the entire bill, since the idea of sex equality was considered outlandish
at the time. 151 Such an understanding of Title VII’s history allows
courts to dismiss arguments that rely on the statute’s remedial purpose
as a basis for expanding recognition of its scope. 152 Scholars have
recently questioned this narrative, drawing attention to the feminist
advocates and lawmakers who contributed to the provision’s passage. 153
Even so, attempts to explicitly interpret “sex” as including gender
identity will run into objections raised by the Bostock dissents over
original and ordinary meaning. 154 Further, prior to Bostock, some
activists and legal scholars suggested that expanded legal recognition
of gender diversity would threaten cis women’s legal rights, suggesting
that further protection will be similarly controversial. 155
Thus, even with the wealth of arguments in favor of Title VII’s
protection of nonbinary individuals, courts may continue to regard
apparent expansions of Title VII with suspicion, especially given the
politically polarizing debates that have accompanied Bostock. 156 This is
not to say that nonbinary Title VII plaintiffs have no recourse under the
statute. Rather, it signals that people interested in achieving
comprehensive gender equality should be wary of arguments that take
the Bostock holding as an unqualified victory.
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1050–1101 (2015) (surveying federal
jurisprudence that curtailed the progress initially made by Title VII).
151. Barzilay, supra note 150, at 67–68.
152. See Schultz, supra note 150, at 1020 (“This mythical reading reinforces the idea of women
as secondary workers, depicting women’s interests as so far outside the realm of employment that
it is inconceivable that Congress would redress workplace sex discrimination as a serious social
problem.”).
153. Barzilay, supra note 150, at 68; Schultz, supra note 150, at 1020 (challenging the
understanding of Title VII’s sex provision as a mere ploy or “joke” and emphasizing the role women
activists played in its passage).
154. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If every
single living American had been surveyed in 1964, it would have been hard to find any who thought
that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation––not to
mention gender identity, a concept that was essentially unknown at the time.”); id. at 1828
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“As to common parlance, few in 1964 (or today) would describe a firing
because of sexual orientation as a firing because of sex. As commonly understood, sexual
orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.”).
155. See Christen Price, Women’s Spaces, Women’s Rights: Feminism and the Transgender
Rights Movement, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (2020) (“[C]ertain of the transgender rights
movement’s legal and policy goals, especially as manifested in gender identity nondiscrimination
laws, represent a new kind of ‘forced closeness,’ which elevates male identities, priorities, and
desires, and undermines women’s rights.”).
156. See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 133 (“[T]he turn to textualism reflects a strategic choice to
turn down the temperature of the culture wars. . . . Liberals would not take well to
Gorsuch . . . lecturing them on equality and acceptance. . . . Those who cling to anti-LGBT views,
meanwhile, would not respond well to the court telling them they are bigots.”).
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III. THE CONTINUED NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Bostock represents significant progress toward gender and
sexual-orientation equality. While Title VII is limited to the
employment context, 157 other federal antidiscrimination statutes
contain sex-discrimination language similar or identical to Title
VII’s. 158 There is not yet a Supreme Court case that applies the Bostock
logic to those statutes, but lower courts have begun to do so. 159 No court
has yet addressed the issue of whether Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of nonbinary gender identity. As this
Note has shown, an eventual holding to that effect is not a
foregone conclusion.
In January 2021, President Biden released an executive order
directing federal agencies to apply Bostock’s logic to other federal laws
with prohibitions on sex discrimination, extending protection to areas
such as education, housing, and immigration law. 160 The executive
order left behind Bostock’s “homosexual or transgender” language,
characterizing Bostock as interpreting Title VII to cover sexual
orientation and gender identity generally. 161 While the order makes no
explicit mention of nonbinary gender identities, it appears to
contemplate protection for people who do not neatly fit into the Bostock
Court’s “homosexual or transgender” categories. 162 Whether courts will
accept this interpretation of Bostock in future litigation remains
unclear. Because of this uncertainty, those interested in furthering
gender equality, and especially equality for nonbinary people, must be
aware of the arguments against Bostock’s applicability to sexual and
gender minorities beyond the binaries. Further, advocates should
continue to consider both legislative and litigation efforts to ensure
more stable protections for people of all genders.
As noted in Bostock, particularly emphasized by the dissents,
Congress has previously considered amendments to antidiscrimination
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“Unlawful Employment Practices”).
158. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of sex” in
education); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination “because of . . . sex” in the rental or sale
of housing); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions” on the basis
of . . . sex”).
159. After Bostock, some circuits have interpreted other antidiscrimination statutes as
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. See Grimm v.
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 613 (4th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a school district
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX by preventing a transgender
student from using the restroom that corresponded with his gender identity).
160. Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021).
161. Id.
162. Id. (“Discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation manifests
differently for different individuals . . . .”).
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law that would explicitly protect against gender-identity
discrimination. 163 The victory of Bostock, while significant, should not
mark the end of these legislative efforts. A 2019 House bill proposed
amending all federal antidiscrimination laws (not just Title VII) to
include an explicit prohibition on discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. 164 The proposed amendment would insert a parenthetical after
the term “sex” specifying that the term includes sexual orientation and
gender identity. Title VII would thus read:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer [to discriminate against an
employee] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex (including sexual
orientation and gender identity), or national origin. 165

Proponents have described this amendment as “codify[ing] the Bostock
decision,” 166 agreeing with the Biden administration that Bostock’s logic
extends beyond homosexuality and transgender identity to cover gender
identity more broadly. While this reading of the case is justifiable, it is
not inevitable, especially with a generally conservative judiciary.
Explicit statutory protection against gender identity discrimination
would once and for all remove these questions from judicial debate,
providing more stable protections for all people by minimizing the
chances of unduly narrow judicial interpretation.
In addition to federal efforts, state legislatures should also adopt
language explicitly prohibiting gender-identity discrimination. Several

163. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (“Since 1964, . . . Congress has
considered several proposals to add sexual orientation to Title VII’s list of protected
characteristics, but no such amendment has become law. Meanwhile, Congress has enacted other
statutes addressing other topics that do discuss sexual orientation.”); id. at 1755 (Alito, J.,
dissenting):
Last year, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would amend Title VII by
defining sex discrimination to include both “sexual orientation” and “gender identity,”
H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019), but the bill has stalled in the Senate. An
alternative bill, H.R. 5331, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019), would add similar prohibitions
but contains provisions to protect religious liberty. This bill remains before a House
Subcommittee.;
id. at 1822–23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting):
In 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 235 to 184 to prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In 2013, the U.S. Senate voted 64 to
32 in favor of a similar ban. In 2019, the House again voted 236 to 173 to outlaw
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Although both the House
and Senate have voted at different times to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination,
the two Houses have not yet come together with the President to enact a bill into law.
164. H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019).
165. Id. § 7 (emphasis added).
166. HRC Staff, The Real-Life Implications of Biden’s Bostock Executive Order, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/the-real-life-implications-of-bidensbostock-executive-order [https://perma.cc/TR7C-7KJA].
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states already have such statutes, 167 which play an important gapfilling role as national legislation stalls. Some states that have provided
explicit protection for gender identity have done so via definition: for
example, Washington state law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and defines sexual orientation to include “gender
expression or identity.” 168 Minnesota law is similar. 169 California law
explicitly states that discrimination on the basis of “sex, gender, gender
identity, gender expression” and “sexual orientation” is unlawful. 170
The terms “gender identity” and “gender expression” are expansive
enough to afford statutory protection even as social and cultural ideas
about gender change over time.
Amending Title VII to explicitly protect gender identity would
more clearly reflect social understandings of the differences between
sex and gender and reduce confusion in the legal world about the
distinctions, if any, between the two terms. An amendment recognizing
the social and cultural changes to the terms “sex” and “gender” since
1964 would help courts better understand claims by plaintiffs of all
genders and minimize opportunities for narrow readings that could
leave some plaintiffs unprotected.
Of course, federal legislation is famously slow moving. While
legislation is desirable, it is unlikely to pass before courts are presented
with complex sex-discrimination cases under Bostock and other Title
VII precedents. 171 Because Bostock did not define the statutory term,
Title VII plaintiffs can and should still argue that “sex” includes
concepts that this Note has referred to as gender. This approach, too,
has models at the state level: six states have interpreted statutory
167. See
Nondiscrimination
Laws,
MOVEMENT
ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited Sept. 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/HL3S-HJ8T] (detailing which states have explicit protections for gender identity
and/or sexual orientation, which states have interpreted laws to include such protections, and
which states have no such protection at all).
168. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.040(27) (West 2020) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and defining sexual orientation to include gender
identity, respectively).
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.02, 363A.03(44) (West 2021) (defining “sexual orientation” to
include “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated
with one’s biological maleness or femaleness”); see Jess Braverman & Christy Hall, The
Groundbreaking Minnesota Human Rights Act in Need of Renovation, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N:
HENNEPIN
CNTY.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.mnbar.org/hennepin-county-barassociation/resources/hennepin-lawyer/articles/2020/03/04/the-groundbreaking-minnesotahuman-rights-act-in-need-of-renovation (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LL2F-4PLK]
(arguing the Minnesota law should be amended to deal more clearly with gender identity).
170. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12920 (West 2020).
171. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1824 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“For several decades, Congress has considered numerous bills to prohibit employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. But as noted above, although Congress has come close,
it has not yet shouldered a bill over the legislative finish line.”).
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prohibitions on sex discrimination to reach discrimination on the basis
of gender identity. 172 While a judicial interpretation approach to
protection is less desirable because it is vulnerable to overruling and
criticism as judicial overreach, it is also likely to be the most
immediately available source of protection until Title VII is amended.
CONCLUSION
Bostock is a significant step towards meaningful equality for
people of all genders and sexual identities. Still, it may not be enough.
As social visibility of sexual and gender diversity increases, courts will
inevitably be dragged into disputes over limits of antidiscrimination
law. The Bostock decision provided few useful tools for navigating those
cases, especially where nonbinary identities are concerned. An
amendment to federal antidiscrimination law therefore remains a
pressing policy priority: Bostock marks an important step on the way
towards gender equality, but it should not be viewed as the end of the
road.
Meredith Rolfs Severtson *

172. See, e.g., Interpretive Statement 2018-1 Regarding the Meaning of “Sex” in the ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act (Act 453 of 1976), MICH. CIV. RTS. COMM’N (May 21, 2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/MCRC_Interpretive_Statement_on_Sex_05212018_6
25067_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4LF-E5EX] (resolving that sex discrimination “includes
discrimination because of gender identity and discrimination because of sexual orientation”);
Guidance on Discrimination on the Basis of Sex Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
HUM.
RELS.
COMM’N
2–3,
https://www.phrc.pa.gov/AboutP A.
Us/Publications/Documents/General%20Publications/APPROVED%20Sex%20Discrimination%20
Guidance%20PHRA.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R968-N73B] (defining terms
related to sex and gender).
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